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1. Introduction 
 
In mainstream criminology, representations of illegal markets tend to rest on two 
specific assumptions: firstly, that illegal markets are monopolised by – very often 
foreign – ‘organised crime’ groups with the objective of expanding illegal markets 
to an international scope; and, secondly, that ‘organised crime’ groups engage in 
campaigns to corrupt fiscal structures (see Potter, 1994). As van Duyne (2010) notes, 
in most of the ‘organised crime’ literature the threat of enormous criminal finances 
being invested in the legal sector, affecting the integrity of the fiscal system and 
undermining fair competition in the business sector, has a prominent position. The 
bulk of these ‘criminal finances’ are allegedly invested in terrorist and ‘serious’ or-
ganised criminal activities (see Lowe, 2006). Although these tenets have been criti-
cised by a number of theorists and researchers (see for example Smith, 1975; Hobbs, 
1988; Naylor, 2004), they continue to exert a powerful influence in official and me-
dia discourses. This influence has been further intensified in the context of the cur-
rent ‘financial crisis’. In Greece, for example, a report on organised crime trends and 
policy countermeasures in 2011, which echoes official and media perspectives from 
the beginning of this financial crises (see, Kolonas, 2008), suggested that “[i]llegal 
trades undercut the turnover of legal merchants and shop-owners . . . thus contrib-
uting to the continuation of adverse economic conditions for the legitimate economy” 
(Michaletos, 2011). Recently it has been suggested – with increasing frequency and 
fervour among primarily political, media, and business circles – that if Greece (and 
by extension the rest of the world) is to get out of the vortex of the financial crisis, 
the role of ‘entrepreneurial ethics’ should be paramount because it ‘provides solu-
tions’ to the financial crisis (Gortzis, 2013; NET, 2013).  
 However, this orthodox analysis is too simplistic. What we try to do in this chap-
ter is highlight the complexity of the situation by introducing another type of crimi-
nal entrepreneur to the discussion: the ‘reluctant criminal undertaker’. By this we 
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mean legal entrepreneurs who are normally involved in the provision of legal com-
modities/services but dabble in illegal markets within the confines of their legal busi-
nesses simply to sustain financial viability. This is part of an on-going project on 
illegal markets and the informal economy in Greece and beyond. Our research is 
based on interviews with entrepreneurs who became reluctantly involved in illegal 
markets in an effort to sustain their legal businesses amid the financial pressures that 
have exerted themselves throughout Greece since the current crisis took hold. In this 
way, we hope to contribute to the discussion about the wide range of illegal behav-
iours associated with the financial crisis as it is manifested in Greece.   
 After discussing the methodology, we summarise the current financial and entre-
preneurial situation in Greece. It is not our intention to provide a finely detailed ac-
count of the Greek financial crisis and the bailouts. This would require a whole book. 
Instead, we offer a basic account of the situation in Greece from late 2009 until the 
signing of the memorandum with the IMF/ECB/European Commission, the 
measures taken by the Greek Government, and their impact on Greek society and 
economy. Although the signing of the memorandum is by no means the end of the 
story (additional fiscal adjustment and austerity measures were introduced in subse-
quent waves in 2011 and 2012), policies enacted in the period 2009-2010 laid the 
foundations for the current fiscal and entrepreneurial environment in Greece. In the 
latter section we present a short summary of the characteristics of the set of cases 
which this chapter is based upon as well as two representative empirical case studies 
highlighting the ‘reluctant undertaking’ of criminal activities. The case studies will 
provide the reader with an insight into the motivations and actions of these criminal 
entrepreneurs. We end the article with a theoretical contextualisation that criticises 
the common notion that ethics can be reinstated at the core of markets without dis-
turbing fundamental political and socioeconomic arrangements.  
 
 
2. Methods and data 
 
The data in this article derive from interviews with thirteen legal entrepreneurs in 
Greece who became involved in illegal markets in order to sustain their businesses. 
The interviews are drawn from an overall data-set that consists of initial material 
from an on-going ethnographic analysis of the criminogenic consequences of the 
collapse of the Greek economy. Table 1 offers an overview of the participants in this 
study. Two case studies have been selected: a confectioner who runs his own shop 
and small-scale production facility, and the owner of an internet café. The data from 
these selected cases are presented more fully in the chapter.  In line with colleagues 
who have used a limited number of case studies in their work (e.g. Carlsson, 2012), 
we have selected these two because they clearly express characteristics that can be 
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found throughout the whole sample and because the detail associated with the case 
study data is integral to the overall analysis. 
 
Table 1. Overview of the interviewees 
 
Name of 
participant 
(pseudonym)  
Age (at 
the time 
of the in-
terview) 
Legal (primary) 
business 
Illegal business Time of in-
volvement in 
illegal busi-
ness 
Criminal 
record? 
 
    
Nick* 24 Confectioner’s 
shop 
Dark chocolate 2010 N    
Chris* 25 Internet café Online gambling 2010 N    
Michael 57 Jeweller’s shop Gold and silver 2010 Y    
George 43 Café Coffee 2010 N    
John 45 Kiosk Cigarettes 2010 N    
Costas 49 Haberdashery Cigarettes 2010 N    
Alex 33 Haberdashery Cigarettes 2010 N    
Aristos 50 Kiosk Cigarettes 2010 N    
Maria 39 Fast-food shop Meat 2010 N    
Tom 51 Garment factory Jackets 2010 N    
Peter 55 Butcher Meat 2010 N     
Paul 63 Alcohol whole-
saler 
Alcohol 2010 N    
Dimitris 52 Petrol station Oil 2010 N    
*Indicates the case studies extensively presented in the chapter.  
 
 The motivations for involvement in illegal markets represented in these two case 
studies also appeared throughout the whole sample. Although space limits the num-
ber of case studies, we should not underestimate the value of data that they can offer 
or the initial signs of clear emergent tendencies that are worth following up on a 
larger scale (see Hall et al., 2008).  
 Participants in all 13 interviews were identified through the researcher’s social 
network, and opportunities for interviewing were taken at social occasions (see 
Hobbs, 2013). It is indicative for this approach that one of the authors was introduced 
to the confectioner at a wedding. As there are no obvious benefits for those con-
cerned in revealing their practices and motives, the role of the intermediaries – the 
people who brought the researcher and the interviewees together – was crucial. The 
intermediaries performed the roles of introducing both parties to each another, which 
led to an initial disclosure of criminologically relevant information, and ‘vouching’ 
for the trustworthiness of both parties, which accelerated the process of access and 
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made the generation of revealing data possible. The arranged interviews were infor-
mally conducted and the interviewees were given autonomy in introducing their own 
concepts and terms regarding the legal and illegal aspects of their business. All in-
terviewees were briefly informed about the objectives of the research and their rights 
as participants, after which they agreed to participate. 
 The reliability and validity of the interviewee’s accounts is an issue that warrants 
some attention. There can be no guarantee whatsoever about the reliability of the 
accounts provided. There may be instances in which participants simply do not re-
member, instances in which issues are concealed from the researcher or instances 
where the accounts become confused and unclear. In order to validate some infor-
mation we used the process of ‘member checking’, “where collected data was 
‘played back’ to the informant to check for perceived accuracy. . . ” (Cho and Trent, 
2006: 322). In addition, crucial aspects of the accounts provided by some of the in-
terviewees were verified by individuals who were known to both the researcher and 
the interviewees, and also to those who acted as the initial points of contact.  
 
 
3. ‘The plagues of the economy and the Golgotha of entrepreneurship’:  
the current financial and entrepreneurial landscape in Greece 
 
In the period 2001-2007 the Greek economy’s average annual growth rate of 4.2 per 
cent was one of the most rapid in Europe. However, this was not due to correspond-
ingly increased competitiveness, a factor that is reflected in the growth of current 
account and trade deficits for this period (Katseli, 2008). It was primarily a result of 
unrestricted access to cheap capital from the financial markets and increased investor 
confidence after the country joined the Eurozone in 2001. This capital was used to 
pay for budget and trade deficits and government spending, and to counterbalance 
low tax revenue rather than establishing a job-creating productive base to increase 
exports and the competitiveness and real wealth of the Greek economy as a whole 
(see Nelson et al., 2011). According to McKinsey & Co. (2012), consumption ac-
counted for approximately 97% of cumulative GDP during this period (almost 20 
percentile points of GDP higher than other European countries) and this was fuelled 
by a high domestic demand that was artificially sustained by credit and large public 
sector. However, Greece was not unusual amongst other Western nations in its shift 
to a consumption-based economy. Although some economies, such as Germany, re-
tained productive manufacturing industries, the West in general was feeling the ef-
fects of an epoch-making structural shift. This can be interpreted as US-led global 
economic policy that orchestrated a reversal of the global flows of trade and capital 
after 1971. This was a complex process, but, as the majority of primary job-rich 
manufacturing centres were relocated to the East, the upshot is that all Western na-
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tions became to varying degrees dependent on consumption of commodities pro-
duced elsewhere, deficits and fiscal stimulus; the so called ‘neoliberal’ project re-
volved around a distinctively Keynesian core (see Varoufakis, 2011). 
 This development, founded on the creation of fragile bubble economies in the 
West, quickly collapsed. The financial crisis in 2007/2008 triggered a major reces-
sion, which would have been worse than the Great Depression had it not been for the 
global financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and European Central 
Bank and the quantitative easing mechanisms now built into the system as safeguards 
(Varoufakis, 2011). This economic convulsion had an enormous negative effect on 
Greece. Two of the main industries, shipping and tourism, entered a vortex, which 
fuelled a persistently high trade deficit resulting in a 15 per cent reduction of reve-
nues in 2009 (Business Week, 2012). This was the start of the most severe financial 
crisis since the restoration of democracy in the country in 1974. The crisis was ex-
acerbated by irresponsible bank lending and a combination of political and institu-
tional weaknesses.  
 Together, these problems have plagued the economy, contributing to Greece’s 
poor productivity, lowering foreign investment and weak competitiveness, and re-
vealing an unsustainable economic model with a very high debt burden (214% of 
GDP in 2008) and the highest public debt and consumer lending in Europe (McKin-
sey & Co, 2012). Adding a further pathogenic problem to the economy was what 
appeared to be endemic tax evasion; only 43 per cent of traders declared income of 
up to €5.000 in 2007 (To Vima, 2008). Funds from tax evasion by big companies 
were diverted to political parties in return for the award of state contracts at over-
priced rates (see Telloglou, 2009). Yet more pathogenic factors included a big infor-
mal labour market, the formation of cartels, speculation in important commodity 
markets (e.g. milk, flour), the inadequacy of the state’s attempts to protect small/me-
dium-size entrepreneurship, a complex and unfair tax system that consistently dis-
advantaged those with smaller incomes (Tsiros, 2008), and what appeared to be a 
remarkable disconnection between academic/governmental research and the national 
economy (OECD, 2012). Excessive and often outdated market government interven-
tions, poor investment and low resource allocation in crucial industries, excessively 
lax quality standards, low early stage entrepreneurial activity, and the failure of the 
Greek state to promote products and services effectively in the international arena 
have all contributed to the current parlous condition of the Greek economy (see 
OECD, 2007).  
 Corruption and a nexus of many contradictory and ambiguous laws and ‘red tape’ 
which deter investors should not be ignored. According to a European Commission 
(2012a) report, the cost of bureaucracy in Greece is estimated at approximately 
22,3% of the country’s GDP in 2010 as opposed to 10,9% in 2009. The wages of 
public sector workers can be a significant factor in boosting consumer demand, but 
this is offset by the fiscal cost of the bureaucratic apparatus and the pressure it places 
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on wage-driven inflation. The latter limits the profit-making and job-creating abili-
ties of legitimate businesses in the private sector. The bureaucracy also significantly 
neutralises the already weak competitiveness of the Greek economy by providing 
practical obstacles to businesses in terms of administrative expenses and delays in 
the initiation of a business.2  
 Looming over these obvious micro-economic factors was the overarching and 
currently inescapable neoliberal macro-economic structure: in a global context of 
trade and capital-reversal most manufacturing start-ups are in developing countries 
that compete to offer low wages and taxes, and retain the ability to devalue currencies 
to boost exports. The West’s manufacturing strength now lies in specialist hi-tech 
production, which tends to be less labour-intensive than primary production. Thus, 
inward investment into weaker Western economies to fuel genuine wealth-creating 
industry is very difficult to secure. This race to the bottom has left most Western 
economies unable to compete as production centres and, therefore, over-reliant on 
credit, consumption and financial services. The upshot is that Greece is one of the 
weakest of a group of Western economies that are finding it almost impossible to 
compete in an unforgiving global market in which national capital exchange controls 
have been abandoned and capital is entirely free to be invested wherever higher re-
turns are more likely.  
 In October 2009, the newly elected (pseudo)-socialist government of Greece an-
nounced that the deficit of the country exceeded the national income by 12 per cent. 
By early 2010 it was more than obvious in international financial circles that Greece 
would have to seek external assistance in order for a default to be avoided (Va-
roufakis, 2011). Initially, the Greek government informally asked for assistance from 
the EU but this request was met with opposition by the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. For five months Greece had to borrow at usurious rates from the financial 
markets, something that worsened the country’s financial situation (Varoufakis, 
2011).  
 In the meantime, two austerity packages were implemented in Greece. The first 
followed the signing of memoranda with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the European Central Bank (ECB) regarding a loan of €80 billion. The package, im-
plemented in February 2010, included a ‘freeze’ in the salaries of all government 
employees and a 10 per cent cut in bonuses, as well as reductions in the numbers of 
public employees (Eleftherotypia, 2010). The second package, implemented in 
March 2010, was a response to mounting fears that the country would become bank-
rupt after pressure by EU economic affairs commissioner Olli Rehn, who visited 
                                                 
2  According to Politis (2007), trying to start up a business in Greece is an expensive and 
time-consuming process; the average start-up capital is double the European average. It 
is also very risky for the individual; on average 53 per cent of the investment cost comes 
from the aspiring entrepreneur’s savings/own capital, and 50 per cent of the remainder 
tends to come from close family members.   
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Greece in March 1, 2010 (Reuters, 2010). Parliament passed a Bill on ‘National 
Economy Protection’ (L.3833/2010). The Bill’s purpose was to save €4,8 billion by 
implementing measures such as 30 per cent cuts in Christmas and Easter bonuses 
and the cancellation of leave of absence payments, an additional 12 per cent cut in 
public bonuses, a 7 per cent cut in the salaries of public and private employees, a 
significant rise in VAT and petrol tax rise and other painful measures (Taxhaven, 
2010). After the implementation of the second package, which also proved unsuc-
cessful in helping Greece to meet fiscal targets, the European Commission (EC), the 
IMF and the ECB set up a tripartite committee (known disaffectionately as the 
‘Troika’) to prepare an appropriate programme of economic policies that would im-
pose upon the nation the conditions of austerity required to secure a larger loan. Since 
the root of the problem was structural weaknesses that the Greek government was 
simply unable (or unwilling) to deal with, inevitably the weight of this programme 
was to fall on the public (Kazakis, 2011). 
 On 1 May 2010, the Greek government announced a series of austerity measures 
to persuade primarily Germany to sign on to a larger EU and IMF loan package. On 
2 May 2010 the EC, the ECB and the IMF agreed to a three-year €110 billion loan 
with a 5,5 percent interest rate that, according to Varoufakis (2011: 207), was ‘high 
enough to make it very unlikely that the Greek public purse would be able to repay 
this new loan as well as the existing ones’. An important condition was attached to 
this loan: that the Greek government would implement an additional series of aus-
terity measures alongside the previous two. Simultaneously, the credit rating agen-
cies in the financial market (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) immediately downgraded 
Greek governmental bonds to an even lower ‘junk’ status (see Ewing & Healy, 
2010). Further tough austerity measures finally introduced – primarily general budg-
etary savings or tax increases – included: 
 Cuts in pay, pensions and jobs (e.g. cuts on public sector allowances in addition 
to the two previous austerity packages and pay cuts for public sector utilities em-
ployees, etc.)  
 Revenues increases through direct and indirect taxation (e.g. a ‘special’ tax on 
high pensions, extraordinary taxes imposed on company profits, rise in the value 
of property (and thus higher taxes), rise of an additional 10 per cent tax for all 
imported cars; increases in VAT (ranging for diverse products) to 23 per cent 
(from 19 per cent), 11 per cent (from 9 per cent) and 5,5 per cent (from 4 per 
cent); a 10 per cent tax increase in luxury commodities and additional taxes on 
alcohol, cigarettes, and fuel)  
 Increase in the average retirement age for public sector workers from 61 to 65 
(OECD, 2011).  
 
This memorandum was reviewed and ‘revised’ at least twice in August and Novem-
ber 2010 to include: cuts in public investment, the sale of some units of the Public 
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Power Corporation; the implementation of business contracts instead of sector con-
tracts between employers and employees (which deregulated the labour market and 
was an initial blow to employment rights); the reduction of expenditure on health 
and public utilities as well as the support of the Greek banking system towards the 
promotion of liquidity in the Greek economy. Despite the last intervention, the banks 
were reluctant to lend money due to fear of ‘bad loans’, a situation commonly re-
ferred to as a ‘liquidity crisis’. This was further exacerbated by two additional fac-
tors: (a) Greek banks are heavily reliant on ECB loans and the majority of Greek 
banks’ assets are tied up with devalued Greek government bonds; and (b) the ten-
dency among the Greeks to withdraw savings in order to cover basic household needs 
but also not to deposit money into banks due to mistrust of the banking system and 
fear of its possible collapse (Bank of Greece, cited in Tsipouras, 2012).  
 Despite the measures introduced, in 2010 Greece’s public debt increased by 
€41,8 billion (see Marias, 2011). Moreover, this deadly cocktail of a global reces-
sion, negative psychology in Greece and beyond, and severe austerity measures, the 
cornerstones of what Kotzias (2010: 18) calls ‘aggressive neoliberal capitalist recon-
struction’, have had rapid and abrupt traumatising effects on the economy and the 
everyday lives of Greek citizens.  
 Firstly, the destructive effects of imposed neoliberal restructuring impacted on 
the country’s economic activity and GDP growth. Whereas growth was 4,2 % from 
2000 to 2007, from 2008 onwards the economy has been continuously shrinking (- 
0,1 % in 2008, - 3,3 % in 2009, - 3,5 % in 2010 and – 6,9 % in 2011) (IMF, 2012). 
Membership of the Eurozone prevented the Greek government from devaluing the 
currency, which could have assisted in the country getting back on the track of de-
velopment by boosting exports, but the ‘race to the bottom’ described earlier means 
that there was no guarantee of success in this endeavour. With a high risk of failure 
in or out of the EU, Greece was trapped in a negative double-bind. 
 Secondly, the effect has been reflected on unemployment and plummeting living 
standards. From a peak of 4,5 million employed Greeks in 2008, half a million had 
lost their jobs either through redundancies or the closure of the small-medium enter-
prises that constitute the backbone of the Greek economy. The result has been a steep 
decline in employment in the country and the creation of a large number of unem-
ployed or underemployed people (particularly those under 25) (graph 1) (EL.STAT, 
2011). Apart from an increase of young Greeks considering emigration (Malkoutzis, 
2011) and the slow erosion of the Greek middle-class, unemployment was the pri-
mary cause of an increase in the number of people who are considered ‘poor’, and 
an increase in the number of those driven to ‘extreme poverty’ when the 12-month 
period of unemployment benefit elapses. Many of the latter group have become over-
reliant on informal/family networks, churches and NGOs. Specifically, 20,1 % of the 
population in Greece are now estimated to live below the poverty line as opposed to 
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9 % in the Czech Republic, 12,3 % in Hungary, 12 % in Slovakia and 17,6 % in 
Poland (see Sotiropoulos, 2012).  
 
Graph 1. Unemployment in Greece, 2006-2011 
 
Source: EL.STAT (2011) 
 
 
Thirdly, the additional tax measures and high inflation, which in August 2010 
reached 5.5 per cent from 1.3 per cent in 2009 (which at the time was below the EU 
average of 1.4 per cent), led to a drop in consumption even in traditionally strong 
sectors of the economy such as car sales and fuel distribution (POPEK, 2010; 
Nautemporiki, 2010). The estimated negative (or, at best, zero) growth rate of the 
income in many employee categories led to a significant reduction in the buying 
power of the Greek public in late 2009 and early 2010, which in turn led to negative 
psychology (IOBE, 2010) and a steep reduction in the consumer confidence of the 
Greek public (graph 2).  
 
Graph 2. Greek consumer confidence, October 2009-December 2010 
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Source: Data compiled from European Commission (2012a) 
 
According to a report by the Greek Foundation for Economic and Industrial Re-
search (IOBE) in November 2010, Greek consumers have been in a state of constant 
depression since ‘they see no light at the end of the tunnel’. Buying power was sig-
nificantly reduced and consumer confidence reached its lowest point in October 
2010, with 95 % of households believing that unemployment would increase in the 
following year, whereas 75 % of households suggested that they would further re-
duce their consumption in the same period. Moreover, 83 % of households estimated 
that they would not be able to save any money in the following 12 months (Georgas, 
2010).  
 The reduction in consumption primarily in the first half of 2010 was unprece-
dented for Greek standards. It affected not only the vast majority of small-medium 
enterprises, which inevitably downsized by sacking employees or reducing their 
wages in order to survive (Malkoutzis, 2011), but also the traditionally ‘healthy’ big 
transnational enterprises such as Coca-Cola Hellenic (see Kitsios, 2010). In this con-
text the Greek government has been unable (or unwilling) to understand that the 
reduction in consumption as a result of high taxation not only further incentivised 
smuggling, which also impacted negatively on the reduction of state income, but also 
increased the cost of production and transportation of commodities whilst simulta-
neously fuelling inflation, which further depressed consumer confidence. The result 
was the complete failure of the state to increase revenues, which was one of the main 
objectives of the restructuring programmes (see Marias, 2011).    
 As a result, according to the World Bank’s (2010) study ‘Doing Business’, in 
2010 Greece was in 109th place among 183 countries when it came to ‘entrepreneur-
ial environment’, and scored worse than all other EU countries as well as countries 
such as Kazakhstan, Zambia and Rwanda. This hostile environment has not only 
created obstacles to aspiring entrepreneurs but also resulted in the breakdown of trust 
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among existing entrepreneurs and obliged some to go up their ‘Golgotha’ to sustain 
their businesses. Chief financial officers from mid-sized companies with growth am-
bitions put Greece at the top of the list of contexts perceived as ‘most risky for in-
vestment’, and consider Greece less attractive than war-torn Syria, Libya, Nigeria 
and Yemen (BDO, 2012). It is unsurprising that when it comes to ‘low business 
confidence’ and ‘fear of the business failing’ Greece is considered the ‘world cham-
pion’ (Politis, 2007; European Commission, 2012b).  
 Less fortunate entrepreneurs were ‘obliged’ to become financially less diligent. 
Data from ‘Teiresias’, the inter-banking company which processes information re-
flecting the economic behaviour of individuals and companies aiming at promoting 
bank-provided credit and reliable transactions in Greece, revealed that there were 
huge increases in bounced cheques and unpaid bills of exchange in 2009 and 2010 
(Teiresias, 2012). This significantly affected intra-market trust and led to business 
introversion in a sociocultural climate of increasing suspicion and cynicism. Many 
other entrepreneurs were forced to cease their activity. According to the National 
Confederation of Greek Commerce (2012), 68.000 small and medium-sized enter-
prises in Greece have gone out of business since 2010, which is considered by the 
Confederation as a significant downturn for Greek small and medium entrepreneur-
ship. This is almost double the 38.000 businesses that shut down over the preceding 
seven-year period of 2003 to 2009 (IOBE, 2012).  
 
 
4. From ‘free’ market to ‘dead’ market to ‘illegal’ market: some evidence 
from the whole sample and the two case studies 
   All 13 interviewees were Greek nationals. 12 were male and only 1 was female 
(7.7%). Their ages at the time of the interviews varied from 24 to 63 (mean = 45 
years). With the exception of Michael, the jeweller who had a criminal record for an 
offence he was not willing to disclose, the rest of the interviewees did not have crim-
inal records. None were persistent offenders with problematic behaviour and in-
volvement in property and violent offences from an early age. As legal entrepreneurs 
before 2010, they were involved only in the archetypal ‘offence’ for (Greek) busi-
ness people, tax evasion. Very importantly, these criminal entrepreneurs had ex-
tremely short criminal careers, and before 2010 they were neither involved in the 
illegal businesses described in this chapter nor in illegal markets distinct from their 
legal business. The involvement of all participants in illegal business at more or less 
the same time in 2010 was a response to the financial crisis as it is currently mani-
fested in Greece. The illegal activities took place only in the final stage of a process 
which involved prior measures, such as asking a reduction in property rent, using 
savings, sacking employees, reducing their hours and paying them less, as well as 
cutting down on raw material or diluting the primary commodity (e.g. Paul, the al-
cohol wholesaler). The sole objective of all the participants in this study was survival 
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in an adverse entrepreneurial environment. However, while all participants evaded 
apprehension, few were able to make their businesses survive. We have been unable 
to follow the latest developments in all the participants’ business activities (legal and 
illegal), but we know that Chris and Dimitris have definitely gone out of business.   
 All the participants’ stories highlight how primary occupations constitute a plat-
form on which opportunities for illegal business can present themeselves. The crim-
inal entrepreneurs interviewed do not engage in alternative business activities but 
attempt to maximise potential within their own businesses. In a way, although reluc-
tant and perhaps ‘atypical’ compared to the motivations of illegal marketers in gen-
eral, these interviewees are in a sense ‘typical’ criminal entrepreneurs ‘extending’ 
their business with illegal ‘branches’ - to use a term coined by van Duyne (1991; 
1993) – within their legal businesses. Practically and psychologically speaking, this 
is what is to be ‘expected’ of them: an obvious and available solution given their  
that suits their skills, contacts and  knowledge of the businesses and their peculiari-
ties and regulation (see van Duyne and Block, 1995).  
 What follows in this section are detailed accounts of two owners of small-medium 
size enterprises; a confectionary shop with an adjoining workshop (Nick), and an 
internet café (Chris). These businesses had been doing quite well but suffered sig-
nificant loss of custom as the Greek economic crisis deepened. 
 
4.1. ‘The survival of the sweetest’ - Nick, the confectioner 
Nick is 24 years old and lives with his parents in a town on a large island in southern 
Greece. His father is a retired confectioner who, in the late 1980s, established a con-
fectioner’s shop in the biggest, busiest, and most central street of the town; a shop 
that is, according to local people, ‘the best shop of its kind in the town if not the 
whole island’. The reason for the shop’s success was that Nick’s father ran the place 
with a particular business philosophy that was valued by customers. 
 
“My father was the best confectioner . . . The most important reason for his suc-
cess was that he always used good quality raw materials. Only the best chocolate, 
only the best sugar, only the best biscuits, only the best milk . . . Anything that 
was not of excellent quality did not enter his workshop. And this is what he always 
used to say to me: ‘If you want to succeed in this business, always use the best 
materials’. Do you know what others in this business do? They get low quality 
materials and the customers see that. For example, what others do when they 
make ice-cream is that they use milk powder or they buy ice-cream from factories 
that is made of milk powder. My father used only normal milk like the one we 
drink. You need a bigger quantity but it is worth it . . . Dark chocolate. That’s 
very important. What others, for example [name of chain confectionery shop], do 
is that they mix small quantities of dark chocolate with vegetable oil and make it 
look thicker. In this way they can make many more small chocolate bars (‘glyka 
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kerasmatos’), you know those with nuts or fruits . . . But the customers know when 
they taste them . . . Plus after a few days, the chocolate bars don’t look well 
because of the vegetable oil… This is why the others have always been second to 
my father . . .”. 
 
After immense pressure from his father, Nick rather reluctantly enrolled in a private 
confectionery school. He is the only child of the family and was expected continue 
the family business. When Nick was student in that school, and specifically towards 
the end of his studies, his father fell seriously ill and he could not continue running 
the shop. Nick’s cousin George, also a confectioner who was working in the same 
workshop, assumed responsibility for producing the bulk of the merchandise until 
Nick’s graduation. When Nick completed the theoretical part of his studies (May 
2010), he immediately applied himself to the business. In the beginning, with 
George’s help, all day-to-day practical problems were solved. However, the most 
difficult challenge was not Nick’s parents’ production-related expectations for their 
son but the already rapidly declining sales. 
 
“Generally, with George’s help, I did not have any significant problems in mak-
ing the stuff. He is really good and hardworking. But people nowadays do not 
buy as much as they used to.  Two years ago [meaning 2008] those who came 
into the shop used to say ‘I want a kilo of this, a kilo of that, a kilo of the other. 
Nowadays [late summer 2010], the whole environment has changed . . . Small 
chocolate bars . . . they [customers] say ‘a piece of this small chocolate bar, a 
piece of the other small chocolate bar, one small piece of this cake’ . . . stuff we 
previously used to give as tasters! And others may come in to buy one cup of ice-
cream while before they’d buy a kilo, maybe more . . . People do not consume as 
much anymore, even the richer of our customers who used to buy stuff for their 
houses . . . Some come and ask ‘can you ‘write them’ [meaning to get the mer-
chandise on credit] and I will pay you at the end of the month?’”. 
 
The significant reduction of sales and profits occasioned Nick to cut down on the 
functional expenses of the business. Evading some more tax was almost impossible 
and he already owned the property on which his shop was located. Cutting down on 
functional expenses was done in various stages. The initial move was to reduce the 
days his employee attended work before eventually sacking her, and immediately 
after that to keep merchandise longer in the shop. 
 
“In the beginning I told to the Albanian girl working in the shop to come at the 
weekends, maybe big name days when there are more customers. Then I told her 
‘we are not doing anything, we can’t collaborate anymore . . .’. My mother has 
been helping a bit with the sales. Then we started keeping stuff for longer. For 
example, we started keeping 2-3 days old cakes, which are not as fresh anymore, 
in the refrigerator so that they last longer. Some years ago, we’d give those cakes 
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to customers for free, and that was good marketing too! Or my mother would take 
them to my grandmother at the village to give to her friends . . . We are even more 
conscious of losses now that the sales are low. If something bad happens you 
have a serious problem. A few years ago another girl we had working in the shop 
forgot the door of the refrigerator open, the ice-cream melted and we had a loss 
of 1.500 euros. Five years ago we’d say ‘these things happen, it’s part of the 
business’. If something like this happened now, we’d probably have to close the 
shop”. 
 
Those steps were also insufficient to guarantee some profit to Nick given the gradual 
reduction in consumption. Having no employees – other than the experienced 
George who significantly contributed to production and acted as pillar of support – 
and no intention to further compromise the quality of his merchandise and conse-
quently jeopardise the ‘name’ of the business, Nick approached the island repre-
sentative of a legal wholesaler who had a personal relationship with his cousin, and 
asked him to provide significantly cheaper dark chocolate, which, as a luxury prod-
uct, is subjected to numerous layers of taxation in Greece.     
 
“I thought we needed to make some more reductions in the expenses of the shop. 
George is too important until I can fully stand on my feet. You cannot cut down 
on electricity, of course . . . 50% of the shop, if not more, is its refrigerators and 
fridges . . . So the next thing you can cut down on is raw materials. But I did not 
want to ruin the ‘name’ of the family by making low quality products. The last 
thing I wanted was people to say ‘[name of shop] is not as good as it used to be’. 
Once your customers get used to a level of quality, you can’t offer them anything 
less. So, I went to this friend of my cousin’s who is representative of [name of 
company] in [name of island], they are confectionery material wholesalers in 
Athens, and asked where I could find ‘cheaper’ but good dark chocolate. Do you 
know what I mean? He said ‘give me a few days and I will get it for you. How 
much do you want?’”. 
 
Nick initially ordered one tonne of raw dark chocolate, which was transported by 
boat from Piraeus to the island, and delivered to him a few days later in big barrels 
(as opposed to the ‘normal’ wrapped 10-kilo plaques of dark chocolate) at the loca-
tion he suggested: his grandmother’s small warehouse at the back of her house in her 
home village a few kilometres away from the town. Nick is not aware of the origin 
of this dark chocolate, although he suspects it is stolen from a well-known specialist 
company’s warehouse in mainland Greece. He, however, verifies not only that the 
quality of the merchandise is excellent but also that this illegal transaction was very 
convenient because, in Greece’s current financial and entrepreneurial conditions, le-
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gal intra-trade exchanges between wholesalers, procurers and shop owners have be-
come rather inflexible due to the decline in the commercial trust that had traditionally 
been an integral part of the trade. 
 
“The quality is excellent and it is cheap . . . why should I care where it comes 
from?. . . I can buy it in that price. Listen, George, we give a battle every day 
here. When you do business normally with invoices etc., the wholesalers, even 
those who know you for years, now ask for cash upfront only; there are no 
cheques, no credit, as it happened previously, nothing . . . just cash. There are so 
many bounced cheques in the market that no one trusts anyone else any more . . . 
And who has this much cash to give upfront now?” 
 
Nick keeps only the necessary (for a few days’ or a week’s work) quantity of raw 
dark chocolate in the shop in order to avoid the possibly unpleasant scenario of the 
financial police paying him a visit for an inspection. His mother transports small 
quantities of chocolate during her numerous visits to Nick’s grandmother. He was 
not willing to disclose the exact amount of money that was saved from buying dark 
chocolate in the black market this one time although, as he suggested, it was sub-
stantial enough to lift some of the financial burdens that were jeopardising his busi-
ness.     
 
 “ . . . We are not talking about big profit here. Enough to ‘cover some holes’ in 
the business and survive in these times . . . The times when the shop made a lot of 
money enough for my parents to live very well, pay for my school, go on holiday, 
buy stuff, and even have savings, are long gone . . . Before, there was not a single 
night that I did not go our even for just one drink in a bar. Now, I may go out for 
a coffee once a week . . . A few years ago my father, my mother and I even con-
sidered expanding the business to [name of nearby town]. A confectioner’s shop 
with the same name that George would be in charge of. Back then we could get a 
loan from the bank and that was it. But this is not going to happen now . . . Now 
we are marginal. We pay bills, standard expenses, the accountant, and there is 
hardly any profit . . . We just survive now”. 
 
 
4.2. ‘In greed he trusts’ - Chris, the internet café owner 
Chris is 25 years old and lives in a city in Western Greece with his father, mother 
and brother. When he was 18 he took pre-university exams and was accepted in For-
est Science School in a small, semi-rural town with a technological institute. As a 
student he was not particularly diligent, and he failed many academic years as he 
spent most of his time with friends in cafés and bars, and in houses where they con-
sumed drugs and played video games. Chris was perceived as a ‘dealer’ by his social 
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circle and was the link between his friends/classmates from the institute and a can-
nabis dealer in the town, who he had met in a bar. He used to get a small commission 
from his friends and classmates whenever he delivered the ‘goods’. He was once 
asked to collect a substantial package of drugs for this particular dealer from the 
town’s coach station in order to obtain a larger quantity of cannabis – about half a 
kilo – on credit. This instance, which resulted in Chris almost being arrested by the 
police, was the turning point in his entrepreneurial activities. Chris’s drug troubles, 
which had been known to his family from the time when a particularly serious inci-
dent had led to Chris’s hospitalisation, made his father decide to establish a small 
business for him in his hometown so that Chris could stay away from ‘bad company’ 
and ‘trouble’. In early 2009 Chris’s father obtained a business loan from a bank and 
opened an internet café on a busy road in a suburb of his hometown. 
 
“My father was disgusted by me and the drugs case and told me ‘that’s it. You 
are coming back to [name of hometown] and we’ll see what you will do. Do you 
want to have a shop and be the boss in it? How about an internet café? You will 
do almost nothing’. I replied ‘sure . . . why not’. It is not much else I could do 
anyway. And what was I supposed to do after I graduated? There is not much you 
can do as a forest scientist anyway . . .”.     
 
Chris’s internet café was opened in the summer of 2009. For a relatively short period 
of time business it was reasonably successful. The primary customers were initially 
teenagers from the wider neighbourhood playing PC games, supplemented by the 
occasional older internet and Facebook users who did not possess a computer.  
 
“In the beginning, and for about 5-6 months, it was not bad at all. It took about 
a month for the business to take off but after that we were full. Mostly teenagers 
playing ‘Counter-Strike’ ‘Call of Duty’ or football the whole day and then some-
one who did not have a computer at home and wanted to book a flight, print the 
ticket or mess about in Facebook. Business was so good that me and my father 
were not enough to run the place and we hired a girl to help with coffees, and the 
refreshments and sandwiches but also to have a beautiful woman in the place”.   
 
The normal pattern of the business changed significantly in the beginning of 2010, 
however, to the point that there were many days in which either no customers entered 
the premises, or, when they did, it was primarily for socialising more than using the 
services offered. This was especially true for local teenagers over the weekend. This 
steep downturn in custom exerted such pressure on Chris and his father that they 
were forced to consider whether they should keep the business.    
 
“At a point, in the beginning of 2010, things changed dramatically. There were 
days in which not a single customer entered the shop. OK, we are not in the centre 
of the city, in a place which everyone sees but it is a relatively busy road. I don’t 
know what happened with the kids, maybe they all got their own PC and did not 
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have to come here to play. But did they all get their own PCs at the same time? 
After a point, a few of those who used to come and play for the whole day, would 
now come to play for an hour but they would not get even a drink, not a single 
coffee, nothing . . . I know what has been going on in Greece, etc. etc. etc. But 
still . . . not a single customer for whole days?! . . .”.  
 
If the business investment was to yield returns, the adverse conditions in which Chris 
and his father were experiencing required immediate action. Initially, while they 
covered expenses and basic family needs by using savings, they asked the owner of 
the property to reduce the rent by €200 per month. The property owner agreed to a 
€50 discount only as he counted on the rent to pay off the monthly instalments of a 
bank loan. The discount did not make much of a difference, and thus additional 
measures had to be taken.    
 
“We thought we were completely destroyed . . . we had already ‘burned too much 
fat’ (meaning they already used much of their savings) . . . We fired the girl that 
was working here. We told her ‘you do a good job here but there are no custom-
ers . . . We are about to close down, sorry Helen . . .’ And the girl understood”.  
 
Firing the employee was quite ‘relieving’ for the enterprise as Chris and his father 
did not have to find her wages, but the financial problems continued as business 
remained remarkably low and pressure from the bank to pay off the loan, in addition 
to the external pressures felt throughout the nation, intensified. Chris’ father came 
up with the idea of transforming part of the business. A number of computers previ-
ously used almost exclusively for PC games were converted into gambling machines 
(the so called ‘froutakia’ – jackpot slots - in Greece). 
 
“We saw that were not going anywhere with the internet café. And the bank ‘had 
put the knife on our throat’ with the loan. You can’t win with the bank . . . And 
we had to pay more and more taxes . . . We would have to close down and my 
father said to me one night: ‘what do you say? Shall we ask my friend John, who 
works in electronics, to tell me how we can change the computers to ‘froutakia’? 
I heard that he knows people who do it’. I replied ‘yes, it is a good idea’. What 
else could you do with these computers anyway? The Greeks love gambling. Give 
them gambling, and take their soul. Have a look at them next door at the ‘Propot-
zidiko’ (‘Betting Forecast Shop’) . . . betting and betting like mad the whole day. 
So, I thought ‘yes, let’s try this too, and see . . .’” 
 
The electronics expert managed to introduce Chris’s father to a colleague who could 
transform the computers into jackpot slot machines controlled by a central server by 
using a software package that was quite expensive (approximately €30.000). Thus, 
Chris and his father had to sell a small piece of land in the countryside as well as use 
the family’s final batch of savings.  
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 The ‘new’ business worked with a relatively small number of trusted customers 
who were acquainted to Chris and/or his father, or individuals who occasionally en-
tered the premises with those acquaintances. Two very frequent and good customers 
were introduced to Chris by his uncle, himself a regular patron to an illegal card 
games ‘club’. Visitors to the café were quickly ‘scanned’ upon entry to the premises. 
This ‘scanning’ required Chris or his father to act as a lookout at specific times, 
operating with a special remote control. This remote control, which the lookout kept 
to hand, turned over the jackpot slots on the screen to a random website page or 
turned off the system altogether when a unknown visitor was present. The lookout 
sat in a small office next to the entrance of the shop. This office was fitted with a 
one-way mirror so that those in the office could see out but those outside could not 
see in. Gambling sessions were not initiated in Chris’s café when ‘new faces’ were 
present unless they came with a trusted patron who wanted to gamble. Cash was 
accepted as a deposit. It was converted into the equivalent number of credits, which 
were inserted into the customer’s computer-cum-slot machine. In addition to the gen-
uine internet user, the business initially worked with an average of five gambling 
customers a day. These customers gambled enough money for the business to be 
sustainable, and the owner to make a small profit. Given the clearly illegal nature of 
the business, advertising the service was not an option. 
 
“It was not as good as I expected. To be honest I expected many customers but 
OK, I don’t complain . . . It is not like it is a totally legal business, and maybe it 
is better this way. A few but good customers that I now. Customers who are will-
ing to play 50 euros, 100 euros or even a couple of hundred euros every time they 
come in. It does not mean that this is the profit! They play many times every time 
they come, 5 euros, then another 5, then 10 euros and that’s how it goes, and they 
have to win sometimes. And sometimes we have to give them ‘air’ (meaning to 
give them a free ‘starting bonus’). Do you get me? They have to be ‘sweetened’ 
so that they come again. But it is much better now with the ‘froutakia’ than be-
fore . . . We are not rich now, you see how the people get by in Greece now, and 
we still have problems. But it is better than before . . . we are not closing down . . . 
for now, at least . . .”    
 
Chris’s initial suspicion of this rather quixotic business effort materialised. Despite 
his attempt to adapt to the harsh entrepreneurial environment, Greece’s enormous 
economic problems were eventually to triumph. The already limited numbers of 
gambling customers were not in the position to spend more money on the type of 
services offered in the café; their ‘bankroll’, to use the gambling vernacular, was 
drying up. Thus, in the first part of 2011, Chris had to close down the business. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
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What we have encountered in our project is a type of criminal entrepreneur that we 
call the ‘reluctant criminal undertaker’ influenced by Sombart’s (1967) cult of the 
‘undertaker’, the pragmatist who simply seeks to ‘get things done’ on behalf of the 
interests of the self, and according to the logic of the market’s ‘dark heart’, in the 
midst of ‘inherited’ or artificially created circumstances, no matter how brutally 
competitive and unforgiving they might be. There is a hard core of ‘undertakers’ 
who operate relatively successfully in capitalism’s socio-economic nodes and arter-
ies, often straddling the boundary between the legal and the illegal, as the influential 
and committed reproductive agents of the project itself. The successful ‘undertakers’ 
lead initially reluctant others into new forms of economic shadow-activity, a reality 
that permeates the new (urban) economies and their socio-economic relations. Where 
Pitts’s (2008: 39) ‘reluctant gangster’ is a ‘product of, and an actor in, a world de-
marcated by poverty, socio-cultural and racial exclusion, illegitimate opportunity, 
and big city corruption’ as well as a response to insecurity, the ‘reluctant criminal 
undertaker’ is the product of the pre-emptive fear of losing one’s finger-hold on the 
economy and ending up in that situation. Ultimately, both are the products of an 
aggressive neoliberal restructuring, deep austerity, and what Fisher (2009) calls ‘cap-
italist realism’, the new dominant ideology based on the principle that no feasible 
alternative to the current form of political economy is possible. 
 There is an overall ideological climate of resignation and cynicism in which our 
distressed small businessmen, Nick, Chris, and the rest of the entrepreneurs we in-
terviewed can see only one real choice: to participate in illegal activities or close 
their businesses and face the likelihood of material poverty and loss of social status. 
This is not the intrusion of ‘anomie’ (normlessness) at the core of society displacing 
traditional values and norms but the opposite, the emergence of a new norm based 
on ideological resignation to the corrupt anti-values at the logical core of the market 
system (see Žižek, 2010; Hall, 2012). 
 Commercial competition is one of capitalism’s fundamental principles. Other 
confectioners must have been put out of business by the success of Nick’s father; we 
cannot argue that he is undeserving of success or that market competition has not 
functioned effectively to deliver the best ice-cream to the customers on the island. 
At a fundamental level, however, Nick is dying by the same sword that killed his 
father’s former competitors, but in a situation where alternative commercial ventures 
or replacement employment are far more difficult to come by. As our discussion of 
Nick’s situation suggests, for example, there is no ‘love’ and ‘trust’ amongst actors 
in the marketplace in the current economic reality. Neither customers nor fellow 
shopkeepers will buy more ice-cream or somehow club together to save his business, 
there will be no surprise gift from a wealthy benefactor and, in the grip of the Troika, 
no help from the government. There are no values or manufactured consent at the 
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heart of markets, merely subjects resigned to an unsentimental logic. In times of 
slump, the social evaporates, exposing the myth of its moral core. 
 In simple terms, as our analysis of Nick and Chris’s situation (as well as the sit-
uation of the rest eleven interviewees) appears to confirm, businesses must continue 
to make profits or die, and in difficult circumstances this imperative can override the 
ethical restraints that can exert greater influence on socioeconomic action in more 
prosperous times. Karstedt and Farrall’s (2006) answer to the growth of ‘market an-
omie’ is the reinstatement of ethics and rules, rather like Weber’s preference for 
‘good business’ over ‘bad business’. This is a perception shared by many in Greece, 
but it is a misconception of the operation of the market (and its legal and illegal 
manifestations) at many levels. There is an accompanying perception that a clear 
boundary exists between the legal and the illegal markets, the upperworld and the 
underworld (van Duyne, 2005), a view at the heart of the conceptualisation of ‘illegal 
markets’ as a negative, imported feature that is at least partly responsible for the 
current financial crisis. However, illegal marketers are there not to subvert the legal 
system but only to exploit opportunities for profit, and in the same way that illegal 
marketers benefit from the legal sector (van Duyne and Block, 1995). Legal busi-
nesses also benefit from illegal marketers in various ways. The illegal markets pre-
sented in the current article are not always antagonistic or injurious (Passas, 2002) 
to their legitimate counterparts or the legal sector as a whole. Moreover, what is also 
interesting to note here is that the legal businesses are the setting in which ‘loyalty 
is borrowed’ (von Lampe, 2007) and/or legal business relationships are transposed 
into criminal business relationships. 
 What Karstedt and Farrall (2006) suggest is also a misconception in relation to 
the principal human drivers of the market. Neither are moral but, respectively, logi-
cal and thymotic (Hall, 2012); enterprises survive by beating competition and mak-
ing profits, and entrepreneurs do not enter markets primarily for moral reasons or to 
provide services to communities, but to grow wealthy and achieve or maintain status. 
In the absence of strong social ties and political solidarity, and thus expecting no 
voluntary support, the beleaguered yet driven entrepreneur facing the unforgiving 
logic of a global capitalist economy administered by unsympathetic neoliberal gov-
ernance will repress moral injunctions and reluctantly resort to unethical acts in order 
to ensure the survival of the business. 
 As circumstances become more trying in specific economically distressed re-
gions, which are not temporary aberrations but likely to be fragments of a shared 
future (Žižek, 2010), ethico-cultural restraints are buckling under the strain placed 
upon them by corrosive forces that are not imposed on the system by unethical pol-
itics, ‘foreign’ intruders or aberrant social actors but welling up from inside the sys-
tem’s enduringly pathogenic core (see Hall, 2012). Neoliberal political economy and 
the ideology of capitalist realism have combined to present us with the only game in 
town. We should not be too surprised when some individuals in the most difficult 
 
 
21 
 
circumstances resort to deception simply to shore up their financial viability and cul-
tural status for one more day. The way things are going in the neoliberal world this 
could catch on in a big way. 
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